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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN: THE
ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN REGULATING MATERNAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
"It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to ensure women full rights as "persons"2 entitled to per-
sonal liberty under the Constitution, the Supreme Court must mandate
that laws regulating women's reproductive health and safety clearly
and unequivocally value women as autonomous persons rather than as
functions of a socially defined maternal role.3 The history of repro-
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
2. "Person" is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as an "individual human be-
ing." THE OXFORD DIcTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 665 (Della Thompson, ed., rev. 2d ed.
1996) [hereinafter OXFORD]. The word "person" is not defined in the Constitution. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) ("The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many
words."). However, the word "person" appears in several amendments, including the Fifth,
Twelfth, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Second Amendments. Id.
Therefore, in order for "person" as used in the Constitution to ensure rights to all
"individual human beings," OXFORD, supra, rights must not be denied based on an individ-
ual's particular gender, race, class, or reproductive status. Thus, for women to be recognized
as "persons," entitled to the constitutionally protected rights endowed to "persons" referred to
in the various amendments, laws must not limit women's rights based on their reproductive
statuses.
3. As used in this comment, the term "maternal" refers to the historically pre-
determined role of American women to fill a social function as mothers and wives. "Mater-
nal" is defined as "of or like a mother; motherly." OXFORD, supra note 2, at 547. The word
"maternal" thus connotes the traditional characteristics of motherhood, those that women are
expected to possess: selflessness, docility, and domesticity. See generally Judith Walzer
Leavitt, Gendered Expectations: Women and Early Twentieth-Century Public Health, in U.S.
HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY: NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 147 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds.,
1995). "Feminine" characteristics are proscribed as the norm, and deviation is viewed as a
danger, with differing treatment across socio-economic lines. Id. The maternal role encom-
passes the expectations of motherhood and femininity and also the expectation that a woman
will have a particular role in, and a particular relationship to, her sexuality; of course, preg-
nancy is directly tied to sex, and thus the concept of a woman's control of her own pregnancy
is intimately related to control over her own sexuality. "Sexual" is defined as "of sex, the
sexes, or relations between them." OXFORD, supra note 2, at 835. The American legal tradi-
tion of separating a woman from control over both her pregnancy and her sexuality are thus
1
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ductive health law reflects the absence of such a standard and the con-
sequent treatment of women in the American legal4 and social' sys-
tems as less than fully persons. 6 Because "personhood" is not recon-
cilable with a predetermined maternal role,7 laws must consistently be
shaped to recognize women as autonomous persons, regardless of
their reproductive statuses, in order to allow women full rights under
the Constitution.8
In Part II, this comment discusses recent developments in three
areas of reproductive health law. Section A addresses the constitu-
tional mandate of the maternal health exceptionin all abortion regula-
tion and the resulting unconstitutionality of the 2004 Federal Partial
Birth Abortion Ban9 due to its omission. Section B discusses the
prosecution of women who use illegal drugs during pregnancy and a
recent Supreme Court decision on a hospital policy targeting prenatal
substance abuse. 10 Section C discusses the development of fetal
homicide laws and the ramifications of the 2004 Federal Fetal Homi-
cide Statute entitled "Protection of Unborn Children"" due to its em-
phasis on the protection of a fetus at any stage of development rather
than on protecting pregnant women from violence.
Finally, in Part III, the recent developments in reproductive health
law are analyzed in terms of their significance to the constitutional
rights of women across race and class lines. This analysis traces both
the changing and enduring themes in the legal treatment of women in
relation to these socially defined categories.
inextricably interrelated. The implication of defining a woman as secondary to her maternal
function is a fundamental inequality between the sexes, and thus creates a necessary equation
of human with male, with women occupying a lesser role. See infra Part II.
4. See generally SUSAN DELLER Ross ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN: THE BASIC
ACLU GUIDE TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS (ACLU Handbook Series, 3d ed., rev. 1993) (outlining
gender discrimination in the American legal system).
5. See generally ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1974) (describing the developing role of women in
American society).
6. Id. at 235 ("The Laws were man's laws, the government a man's government, the
country a man's country. "); see also Ross ET AL., supra note 4, at xv (explaining that "legally
sanctioned discrimination [against women] still persists" in the American legal system).
7. Inherent in the idea of a predetermined maternal role is the lack of personhood;
when women are relegated to a maternal function, they are denied the agency of personhood.
8. This argument encompasses the treatment of women across sexual orientation, age,
and other differing particular reproductive circumstances. See infra Part Il.
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 2004).
10. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2004) (referred to in text as Federal Fetal Homicide Stat-
ute).
[Vol. 41
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss2/7
2005] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRQDUCTIVE HEALTH LAW 509
This comment argues that in order to protect the rights of all
women, American laws must prioritize each woman's autonomous in-
terests above a historically determined maternal role. Until laws are
restructured to value a woman as an autonomous individual above her
maternal role, women will not be afforded full "personhood" under
the Constitution.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS N REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH LAW
This Part discusses recent developments in reproductive health
law within the context of the American legal system. First, Section A
discusses the development of the maternal health exception in abor-
tion regulation. This discussion includes the recently passed Federal
Partial Birth Abortion Ban and its lack of the constitutionally man-
dated exception. Next, section B describes the development of crimi-
nal prosecutions of women for drug use during pregnancy and the cur-
rent state of the law for drug-addicted pregnant women. Lastly,
section C traces the development of fetal homicide laws including the
Federal Fetal Homicide Statute, "Protection of Unborn Children."
A. The Maternal Health Exception
The maternal health exception was established in Roe v. Wade 2 to
protect women from state abortion legislation when an individual
woman's health is threatened by a pregnancy. 13 This section first
looks to the historical significance of the maternal health exception to
all abortion legislation followed by a discussion of the 2004 Federal
Partial Birth Abortion Ban and its lack of the mandated exception.
1. Development of the Maternal Health Exception
Abortion was legal at common law-indisputably before "quick-
ening,"' 14 and likely after quickening as well.15 Although the nine-
teenth century saw a sweeping criminalization of abortion across the
12. 410U.S. 113(1973).
13. Id. at 162-65 (recognizing a woman's valid interest in her own health throughout a
pregnancy).
14. See, e.g., id. at 132 (defining "quickening" as "the first recognizable movement of
the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy").
15. Id. at 132-36. "It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before
"quickening". . . was not an indictable offense." Id. at 132. " [t now appear[s] doubtful that
abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruc-
tion of a quick fetus." Id. at 136.
3
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states," in 1973 the United States Supreme Court found the abortion
right rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest. 7 Follow-
ing its precedent in recognizing the Constitution's protection of a per-
sonal liberty interest in the. right to privacy, the Court held in Roe that
the liberty interest extends to pregnant women deciding whether or not
to continue a pregnancy. 8
The recognition of a woman's constitutional right to terminate a
pregnancy was a landmark decision in its application of the right to
privacy and personal liberty to women during pregnancy.' 9 At the
same time, the Court recognized that "[t]he privacy right involved...
cannot be said to be absolute," but rather "a State may properly assert
important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical
standards, and in protecting potential life."'2 In its analysis of the ex-
tent to which a State may regulate the abortion right, the Court estab-
lished the requirement of a maternal health exception to all abortion
regulation, regardless of the stage of pregnancy. 21
The maternal health exception was developed in Roe and reaf-
firmed in Planned Parenthood to protect a woman's liberty interests
even as it recognized a State's interest in potential life. 22 The frame-
work set forth by the Supreme Court regulating abortion legislation
focuses in large part on the development of a fetus as a pregnancy
progresses.23 In the early stages of a pregnancy, a State's interests in
maternal health and the potential life of the pregnancy are low, while a
woman's privacy interest in determining whether to terminate the
pregnancy is high.24 As a fetus develops, the State's interest in both
16. See, e.g., JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 253-88 (1994) (explaining the political motivations in developing abor-
tion laws at the turn of the century in a chapter entitled Criminalizing Reproductive Control:
The End-of-Century Campaigns to Disempower Women).
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
18. Id. at 152-53. "[T]he Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152. Further,
"[tihis right of privacy. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
19. Id. (finding the liberty interest encompasses a woman's decision whether to continue
a pregnancy).
20. Id. at 154.
21. Id. at 164-65 ("For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its inter-
est in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life
or health of the mother."); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting
Roe and reaffirming the necessity of a maternal health exception subsequent to viability).
22. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 870-73; Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-65.
23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-65.
24. Id.
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maternal health and in the potential life of the fetus increases, and at
some point may outweigh the individual woman's privacy interest.25
However, a woman's interest in her own health and safety is never en-
tirely overcome, even as the pregnancy approaches full term.26 Thus,
even if an abortion regulation seeks solely to proscribe a late term
abortion, it is still required to include a maternal health exception.27
2. The Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Since Roe and its progeny established a woman's right to choose
and set forth the balancing act between a woman's interests and a
State's interests in a pregnancy, 28 the states have developed a variety
of laws proscribing late term abortion procedures. 29 In 2000, the Su-
preme Court struck down the Nebraska Partial Birth Abortion Ban as
unconstitutional, in part because it lacked a maternal health excep-
tion.30 The Nebraska Ban proscribed one procedure for terminating a
late term pregnancy, commonly referred to as a D&X,3 1 and was also
broad enough to cover a more common procedure for terminating both
pre- and post-viability pregnancies, known as the D&E.32
Subsequently, a ban nearly identical to the Nebraska statute, the
Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, was passed by Congress and
signed into law in 2004.13 Like the Nebraska ban, the Federal Ban
proscribes the D&X procedure, and lacks an exception for the health
of the mother.34 In accord with the Supreme Court's ruling on the re-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Melissa de Rosa, Partial-Birth Abortion: Crime or Protected Right?, 16
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 199,220-22 (2002).
30. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) "First, the law lacks an exception
'for the preservation of the ... health of the mother."' Id (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
31. Id. at 923-30. The D&X procedure consists of:
1. deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days;
2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footlong breech;
3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and
4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal
delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus. Id. at 928 (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 923-30. "D&E 'refers generically to transcervical procedures performed at 13
weeks gestation or later."' Id. at 924 (citation omitted). Also, the Nebraska ban "applies both
pre- and postviability." Id. at 930. "Viability" refers to the point at which a fetus is capable
of surviving outside the womb. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 749 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
33. 18 U.S.C. A. § 1531 (West 2004).
34. Id. (providing an exception to save the life, but not to preserve the health, of the
mother).
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quirement of an exception to preserve both the life and the health of
the mother in any abortion legislation, United States District Courts
have imposed injunctions on the Federal Ban and indicated that it is
not likely to be upheld by the Supreme Court.35
Another issue the courts have heard in recent years concerning the
status of a fetus in relation to the rights of a pregnant woman is the
criminal prosecution of women who use drugs during pregnancy.
These prosecutions raise concern both for the potential life of a preg-
nancy and the rights of a woman simultaneously experiencing preg-
nancy and addiction.
B. Targeting Women Who Use Drugs During Pregnancy
This section first discusses the development of prosecutions
against women for prenatal substance abuse. It then describes the cur-
rent law regarding women who use drugs during pregnancy.
1. Development of the Prosecution of Women for
Drug Use During Pregnancy
The push to criminalize prenatal substance abuse as a particular
offense was spurred by "the problem of 'crack babies' . . . widely per-
ceived in the late 1980s as a national epidemic, prompting consider-
able concern both in the medical community and among the general
populace."36 In conjunction, the medical field released studies show-
ing the risk to fetuses from in utero exposure to illegal drugs.37 As
advocates sought to mitigate the damage to infants due to drug use by
their mothers, one option was criminal prosecution, including "both
prebirth seizures and postbirth sanctions."38
35. See, e.g., Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 809 (2004) (finding the ban "un-
constitutional because it does not allow, and instead prohibits, the [D&X] procedure when
necessary to preserve the health of a woman"); see also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 287
F. Supp. 2d 525, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding plaintiffs showed "a likelihood of success
on the merits" that the Ban "is unconstitutional because, among other things, it does not con-
tain an exception to protect women's health"); Planned Parenthood Fed'n. v. Ashcroft, No.
C03-4872PJH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20105, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2004) (imposing a
temporary restraining order on the Federal Ban because plaintiffs "demonstrated a likelihood
of success in showing that the [Ban's] failure to provide for an exception to preserve women's
health renders the law unconstitutional").
36. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 n.1 (2001).
37. Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal Status for Prena-
tal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1255, 1255 (1998) ( "A study by the
National Association for Prenatal Research and Education revealed that approximately
375,000 babies per year suffer potential health damage from in utero exposure to drugs.").
38. Id. at 1257.
[Vol. 41
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss2/7
2005] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH LAW 513
Consequently, numerous women have been subject to prosecution
for drug use during pregnancy.3 9 In the absence of specific legislation,
criminal prosecutions of women for prenatal drug use are based on
one of three theories:
(1) abuse of or endangerment to the child resulting from the mother's sub-
stance abuse while pregnant; (2) possession of controlled substances as a
result of the presence of such substances in the body or bodily fluids of the
infant; or (3) postpartum delivery or distribution of controlled substances
to the child through the mother's umbilical cord for the period after birth
and before the cord is clamped.4 °
In response to challenges to the applicability of criminal statutes
to prenatal substance abuse,4 some jurisdictions have sought legisla-
tion specifically targeting women who use drugs during pregnancy.42
However, such attempts have been largely unsuccessful. 43 The lower
courts have addressed the criminal prosecution of women who use
drugs during pregnancy in various ways; while some courts have al-
lowed forced hospitalization and imprisonment for drug-addicted
pregnant women, others have categorically disallowed child abuse
laws to apply to prenatal substance abuse.'
2. Current Law for Women Who Use Drugs During Pregnancy
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the weight ac-
corded to the interest of a State versus the interest of a woman in
searching a woman's body for evidence of prenatal substance abuse in
Ferguson v. Charleston.45 In Ferguson, the court addressed a hospital
policy of collecting evidence of drug use from pregnant women's bod-
39. Id. at 1255 ("Since 1985, at least 200 women in thirty states have been criminally
prosecuted for the use of illicit drugs or alcohol during pregnancy through a variety of tac-
tics.").
40. James J. Hodge, Jr., Annotation, Prosecution of Mother for Prenatal Substance
Abuse Based on Endangerment of or Delivery of Controlled Substance to Child, 70 A.L.R.
5th 461, at *la (2004).
41. Louise Marlane Chan, S.O.S. From the Womb: A Call for New York Legislation
Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 209-10 (1993) (de-
scribing how prosecution under child abuse laws "contravenes legislative intent and arguably
denies defendants the due process requirements of notice and fair warning").
42. See Lynn M. Paltrow et al., Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use
Alcohol or Other Drugs, Year 2000 Overview (describing attempts by states to criminalize
drug use by pregnant women), at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/gov re-
sponse review.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., State v. Ikerd, 369 N.J. Super. 610, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004);
Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 4 (S.C. 1997); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ohio 1992).
45. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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ies for criminal prosecution purposes.' Because the policy in ques-
tion was conducted at a public hospital, "the members of its staff
[were] governmental actors, subject to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment. '4' Thus, the case involved a question of whether "the
interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant
women from using cocaine can justify a departure from the general
rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not au-
thorized by a valid warrant. 48
Reversing the lower court's finding that the circumstances of the
case allowed the government "to conduct searches without warrants or
probable cause" 49 under the "special needs doctrine,"50 the Court held
that "[tihe Fourth Amendment's general prohibition against noncon-
sensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily applie[d]
to [the hospital] policy."5 The policy of searching the urine of preg-
nant women for criminal evidence violated "[t]he reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic
tests in a hospital . . . that the results of those tests will not be shared
with nonmedical personnel without her consent."52 Although the legal
limitations of allowing criminal prosecution of women for drug use
during pregnancy are less than clear, the Court in Ferguson estab-
lished some guidelines as to what is constitutional in the course of
prosecuting women who use drugs during pregnancy: the testing of
pregnant women's urine for drugs is held to the general standard for
searches under the Fourth Amendment. 3 However, on remand, the
Court of Appeals limited the ruling to women who were tested before
delivery; a woman whose newborn was tested for drugs was held to
suffer "no violation of her Fourth Amendment rights."54
States seeking to protect the potential life of a pregnancy are con-
cerned with a woman's treatment of her own body as well as the ac-
tions of others towards the pregnant woman. Thus, to deter violence
towards women, some states have passed criminal statutes defining
46. Id. at 69-70.
47. Id. at 76.
48. Id. at 70.
49. Id. at 69-70.
50. Id. at 76.
51. Id. at 86.
52. Id. at 78.
53. Id. at 67.
54. Ferguson v. Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395 (5th Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 41514
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violent attacks on pregnant women as feticide. This issue has risen
to the national level with the 2004 Federal Fetal Homicide Statute. 6
C. The Federal Fetal Homicide Statute
This section first discusses the history of prosecuting attacks on
pregnant women as fetal homicide. It then discusses the passing of
the Federal Fetal Homicide Statute in 2004.
1. Historical Development of Fetal Homicide Laws
Under the common law, homicide was not possible until after an
infant was born alive. 7 The "born-alive" rule was premised on the be-
lief that human consciousness began upon a live birth.58 The common
law thus recognized the violent causing of a miscarriage as a lesser of-
fense and provided for various punishments depending on whether a
fetus had quickened. 9
Advancements in the medical understanding of fetuses have al-
lowed for determinations of whether attacks on pregnant women are
the actual cause of fetal demise. ° The argument ensued that if an at-
tack on a pregnant woman could be proven as the cause of the termi-
nation of her pregnancy, the attacker should be held liable for mur-
der.61 States have been successful with this argument in obtaining
homicide convictions for defendants who have killed or attacked a
pregnant woman, where it was proven the pregnancy was terminated
due to the harm to its mother.62
55. States that Prohibit Crimes Against the Unborn Child, AUL Model Legislation and
Policy Guides (explaining that "[tiwenty-seven States treat the killing of an unborn child as a
form of homicide," and outlining various state statutes), at
www.unitedforlife.org/guides/fh/fh_statutes.htm (last visited Mar 13, 2005).
56. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2004).
57. Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 64
A.L.R. 5th 671, 671 (2004).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 881 (Cal. 2004); Utah v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d
1171, 1172 (Utah 2004); Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Ky 2004); People
v. Dennis, 950 P.2d 1035, 1055 (Cal. 1998); People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 591 (Cal 1994).
62. See supra note 59.
9
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2. The Federal Fetal Homicide Statute
Following the trend of states in recognizing the attack/killing of
pregnant women resulting in the termination of pregnancy as homi-
cide, Congress passed a federal statute in 2004 providing that the act
of terminating a woman's pregnancy (expressly distinguishing a con-
sensual abortion) is a separate offense, punishable as if the offense had
been committed upon the mother.63 The statute provides that the act
of forcefully terminating a woman's pregnancy, regardless of the stage
of pregnancy, falls within the scope of the statute. 64 Thus, signifi-
cantly, the statute does not distinguish the crime according to the de-
velopment of a fetus, but rather treats identically an attack whether it
occurs instantly after conception or at full term.6
The developments in reproductive health law in recent years share
a common theme in their perpetuation of the treatment of women ac-
cording to a maternal role. These developments have roots in the
American social and legal systems and have implications for women
across race and class lines.
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The American legal system has a long history of granting women
lesser rights then those accorded to men.66 When the rights denied to
women are those fundamental rights ensured by the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments, women are not being recognized as "persons"
under the Constitution. Laws eroding a woman's rights on the basis
of her reproductive capacity perpetuate the definition of women as
primarily maternal beings and secondarily autonomous individuals.
Only through a consistent recognition of women as autonomous indi-
viduals entitled to control over their own bodies will women be fully
recognized as "persons."
A. Analysis of Current Laws
The legal treatment of women according to a predetermined ma-
ternal role has led to a conflict between a woman's interest in her own
body and the government's interest in her reproductive status.67 The
63. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2004).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Ross ET AL., supra note 4, at xiii.
67. See, e.g., Kowalski, supra note 37, at 1256 (explaining "possible conceptual models
[Vol. 41
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recent developments in reproductive health law reinforce the tradi-
tional role of women in American society as primarily wives and
mothers, and secondarily as autonomous persons with the right to de-
termine the course of their own lives. This section analyzes the de-
velopments in all three areas and their effect on women across race
and class lines.
1. The 2004 Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban
The maternal health exception established in Roe is indisputably
necessary to ensure that medical procedures are available if believed
by a woman and her doctor to be the best and safest method under the
circumstances of a particular case.68 Yet, the 2003 Partial Birth Abor-
tion Ban omits a maternal health exception, allowing the procedure
only if a woman's life is threatened.69 Ultimately, because all abortion
regulation must contain a health exception to pass constitutional mus-
ter,7" the failure to include a health exception in the Federal Partial
Birth Abortion Ban renders it necessarily unconstitutional. The sig-
nificance of the passing of the Federal Ban despite its clear constitu-
tional flaw is its indication of the willingness of Congress to disregard
the interests of a woman in her own health and safety in favor of its
interest in the continuation of a pregnancy. This readiness to disre-
gard the interests of an individual woman is interwoven in the history
of abortion regulation.71
Feminist analyses of the development of abortion laws have iden-
tified the use of abortion regulation to control women within and
across race and class lines, with a blatant disregard for the interests of
individual women. 72  Early campaigns to criminalize abortion at-
which characterize the rights of a pregnant woman in relation to her fetus," including the
model "whereby a woman is distinct from her fetus and, thus, has interests at odds with her
fetus").
68. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64.
69. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 2004).
70. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880
(1992); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 938; Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d. 805, 808
(D. Neb. 2004). The constitutionality of the ban ultimately turns on whether the procedure is
ever medically necessary to preserve the health of the woman, and whether Congress has a
right to categorically ban the procedure if it is. Id. Accordingly, amidst arguments over the
humanity of the procedure, the congressional and judicial debates over the constitutionality of
the ban focus on the lack of the health exception, with support and opposition for the ban ar-
guing over the safety and necessity of the procedure. Id..
71. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Femi-
nist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD
43 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).
72. Id.
11
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tempted to define a woman's existence through her reproductive ca-
pacity.73 The abortion option allowed a woman to choose when and
whether to have children, a concept at odds with the developing
American ideology of the nuclear family with women confined to the
private sphere.74 The medical community's anti-abortion campaign of
the nineteenth century urged "that a woman who shirked her duty to
bear children committed 'physiological sin' . . . . In this compound
concept of physiological sin, the profession translated religious, legal,
and customary norms of marital duty into therapeutic terms. As doc-
tors repeatedly argued, abortion and contraception both threatened
women's health. 75
Significantly, the anti-abortion campaign was couched in national-
istic and racist terms; the fear of white, middle class women's access
to abortion inspired entreaties to women's race and class affiliations.
As one leader of the anti-abortion campaign argued:
[T]he great territories of the far West, just opening to civilization, and the
fertile savannas of the South, now disenthralled and first made habitable
by freemen, offer homes for countless millions yet unborn. Shall they be
filled by our own children or by those of aliens? This is a question that
our own women must answer; upon their loins depends the future destiny
of the nation.
76
These racial overtones in the campaign to criminalize abortion
remained a theme in American birth control politics; in fact, "[t]he
first publicly funded birth control clinics were established in the South
in the 1930s as a way of lowering the Black birthrate, and during the
Depression, birth control was promoted as a means of lowering wel-
fare costs. '7  Government encouragement or discouragement of
women to bear children across race and class lines reflects its con-
cerns over racial integration and changes in socio-economic roles.78
Thus, the criminalization of abortion in the nineteenth century was
both a reaction to the threat of increased women's rights during the
suffrage movement 79 and to the threat of racial integration.8"
73. Id. at 48.
74. Id. at 51.
75. Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
77. Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 224, 242 (Mar-
tha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (citations omitted).
78. Siegel, supra note 71, at 49.
79. Id. at 51-52 (""Restrictions on abortion and contraception were enacted at a time
when state legislatures were liberalizing the marital status doctrines of the common law," al-
lowing "a new way of regulating wives' conduct, one that deviated in method and preoccupa-
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While government objectives evolve with shifts in the socio-
economic climate, the classist and racist components of the anti-
abortion campaign remain present in the current efforts by Congress to
restrict abortion rights.8' Today, limits on reproductive freedom dis-
proportionately affect poor women and women of color: "Because of
racism, it is more likely that the government will interfere with their
reproductive decisions; because of their poverty, they are more likely
to need the government's assistance to facilitate those decisions."82
While the threat to the maternal health exception in abortion regula-
tion implicates the constitutional rights of all women, as the mandate
is a safeguard of the basic right of women experiencing pregnancy to
determine the course of their own lives,83 the erosion of the right will
disproportionately affect poor women and women of color.
An abortion regulation which focuses solely on the interest in a
potential life, compelling women to fulfill a maternal function, con-
travenes the core of the Supreme Court decisions which recognize a
woman's fundamental right to privacy and liberty. If it is necessary to
ban an abortion procedure that is unsafe due to its risk to women's
health, a statute must be framed explicitly towards that end. Other-
wise, a State is clearly prioritizing its interest in the woman's maternal
role (through the potential life she carries) above the woman's interest
in her own health.' Thus, the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, in
prioritizing an interest in potential life above the health and safety of a
woman, violates the basic constitutional rights of a woman during
pregnancy.85
tion from traditional doctrines of marriage and family law.").
80. Id. at 59 "In the nineteenth century, the 'native' American middle class responded
to the populationist 'threat' posed by immigrant and African-American families by regulating
the reproductive conduct of its own women." Id. An analysis of current abortion regulations,
therefore, should "attempt to ascertain the gender, race and class salience of such regulation,
whether birth-compelling or birth-deterring in form." Id.
81. Id.at5l-52.
82. Roberts, supra note 77, at 243.
83. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (reaffirming that "subse-
quent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother") (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
84. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 843.
85. Further, although the legislative intent behind the ban is clearly not on maternal
health, but rather on protecting children in the process of birth, the ban does not alter whether
or not any children will be born; instead, it proscribes one of several procedures which may
be used to terminate a pregnancy, as opposed to whether or not the pregnancy may be termi-
nated. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000).
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To ensure women's constitutional rights are upheld regardless of
their reproductive statuses, the courts must maintain a standard of re-
quiring legislation to uphold a woman's interest in her health above
the state's interest in a woman's maternal function. This standard
must apply within and outside of the abortion context. For example,
as the courts address issues such as the criminal prosecution of women
for drug use during pregnancy, a woman's individual rights must not
be compromised.
2. Prosecution of Pregnant Women for Drug Use
As stated above, a State may not use its interest in the potential
life of a pregnancy as justification for suspending a woman's constitu-
tional rights.86 A woman's individual interests do not disappear on the
basis of her pregnancy. Prosecutions of women for drug use during
pregnancy threaten to impede women's constitutional rights by ille-
gally expanding state statutes 87 and justifying illegal intrusions into the
body in the name of fetal health.88
Prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant women have sparked de-
bate over the legality of state action seeking to protect unborn chil-
dren from abuse.89 While the Court in Ferguson held that hospitals
may not use the supposed necessity of preventing drug use by preg-
nant women 9° to impose unreasonable searches and seizures upon a
pregnant woman's body,91 on remand, the Fourth Circuit specifically
allowed the search of an infant immediately upon birth for use in the
criminal prosecution of its mother.92 Although the court recognized
that, as a matter of law, none of the women tested pursuant to the pol-
icy "gave their informed consent to the taking and testing of their
urine for evidence of criminal activity for law enforcement pur-
86. See Roe, 410 U.S. 164-65; Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 846-47.
87. See Chan, supra note 41, at 209-10.
88. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001).
89. See generally Lisa Eckenwiler, Why Not Retribution? The Particularized Imagina-
tion and Justice for Pregnant Addicts, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89 (2004) (arguing against
criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant women).
90. Paltrow et al., supra note 42, at I ("Today, dozens of carefully constructed studies
establish that the impact of cocaine on the developing fetus has been greatly exaggerated and
that other factors are responsible for many of the ills previously attributed to pregnant
women's use of cocaine.").
91. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (deciding the hospital policy of searching pregnant
women's urine for drug use in the name of fetal health did not fall within the "closely guarded
category of 'special needs"').
92. Ferguson v. Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395 (4th Cir. 2002).
520 [Vol. 41
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss2/7
2005] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH LAW 521
poses,"93 it then limited a woman's right to privacy by excluding from
the definition of the woman's privacy interest the woman's just-
delivered baby's body, even though they share bodily fluids.94
By allowing the prosecution of women based on the testing of
their babies immediately upon birth, the court allows an easy way
around the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of
women during pregnancy. Rather than a routine application of the
standing requirement that one must have a personal privacy interest in
the area searched to raise a claim of a constitutional violation,9 it al-
lows the government direct access to a woman's bodily fluids found in
her baby's body immediately after an umbilical cord is cut.96 Hospi-
tals are encouraged to work in conjunction with law enforcement to
wait until a woman gives birth to test for drugs in a baby's system,
since that evidence will be allowed in the criminal prosecution of its
mother. A pregnant woman's Fourth Amendment rights are thus eas-
ily eradicated as searches of her bloodstream, through her just-
delivered baby, are allowed without any showing of probable cause
for a search. 97
Further problematizing prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant
women is that such prosecutions target those women most vulnerable
to attack.98 This is because "[c]ertain forms of fetal-protective regula-
tion are overwhelmingly directed at pregnant women who are poor, of
color, and on public assistance (for example, forced surgical treat-
ment, or drug-related prosecutions and custody deprivations)." 9
Viewed in light of the nineteenth century anti-abortion campaign,
prosecutions of women for drug use may claim to be "undertaken to
protect the unborn," but in fact "driven by antipathy to poor women of
color and the children they might bear."" ° To fully appreciate the rac-
ist and classist implications of these prosecutions, it is illuminating to
93. Id. at 386.
94. Id. at 395 (finding that a woman has no "reasonable expectation of privacy in her
newborn child's bodily fluids").
95. Id. ("[The] term 'standing' refers, in Fourth Amendment context, to [the] question of
whether [a] party's own expectation of privacy has been infringed.") (citing Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978)).
96. Id. (finding that the use of the fluids from the baby's body may be used against the
mother because it falls within "the general rule that an expectation of privacy does not arise
from one's relationship to the person searched").
97. For an explanation of the constitutional requirement of probable cause for a search,
see generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.01 (3d ed.
2002).
98. See Eckenwiler, supra note 89, at 91.
99. Siegel, supra note 72, at 56 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 56-57.
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consider whether society would "so readily contemplate criminal
prosecution, 'protective incarceration,' or custody deprivation as re-
sponses to maternal addiction if the policies were to be applied to
privileged women rather than to the poor[.] 10
Beyond their fallibility as disproportionately affecting poor
women and women of color, prosecutions of women for drug use dur-
ing pregnancy through implementation of policies by hospitals and
prosecutors seeking to protect unborn children from abuse are widely
regarded as misguided and ineffective."0 2 Contrary to the medical re-
ports released in the 1980s and 1990s, exposure to drugs in utero is
not the major cause of injury to fetuses; actually, poverty and malnu-
trition are the most damaging.103 Thus, rather than serving the func-
tion of protecting children, prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant
women ultimately violate a woman's right to privacy and discourage
women from seeking prenatal care through threatening criminal
prosecution and loss of parental rights."°
To effectively promote prenatal health, it is critical that legislation
recognizes that upholding a woman's constitutional rights and promot-
ing prenatal health are not mutually exclusive.105 Because neither in-
terest is served through imposing state objectives on a woman's body
without her consent," 6 legislation should be formulated with both in-
terests in mind. The Court has already recognized the threat of viola-
tions of fundamental rights of women during pregnancy when the
choice of medical procedures is allowed to be determined by courts
rather than the woman. 07 Similarly, there should be a consistent rec-
ognition that all of a woman's constitutional rights are protected dur-
ing pregnancy. Indeed, "[n]o right is held more sacred, [n]or is more
carefully guarded ... than the right of every individual to the posses-
101. Id.at 57.
102. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 n.23 (recognizing "a near consen-
sus in the medical community that programs of the sort at issue, by discouraging women who
use drugs from seeking prenatal care, harm, rather than advance, the cause of prenatal
health").
103. Paltrow et al., supra note 42, at 1 ("Indeed, a 1999 study found that poverty has a
greater impact than cocaine on a child's developing brain.").
104. Id. (explaining the position of "leading medical and public health groups" that
"prosecution of substance-using pregnant women.., would deter women from obtaining nec-
essary health care and would thus cause harm to both maternal and fetal health").
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Ross ET AL., supra note 4, at 210-11 (describing the case of In re A.C., 573 A.2d
1235 (D.C. App. 1990)).
522 [Vol. 41
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss2/7
2005] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH LAW 523
sion and control of [her] own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference of others,"' 8 regardless of her reproductive status.
It is also a fundamental human right of every woman to be free
from violence, both during and not during pregnancy. However,
drafters of statutes seeking to criminalize attacks on pregnant women
must remain cognizant of the right of each and every woman to de-
termine the course of her own pregnancy.
3. The 2004 Federal Fetal Homicide Statute:
"Protection of Unborn Children"
The intertwined goals of maternal and fetal health are best served
through valuing and meeting the needs of all women. A government
cannot try to combat violence against a woman's pregnancy without
addressing violence against women. Essential to eradicating gendered
violence is treating women as "people" and not as objects fulfilling a
maternal role. Since most violence against women is committed by an
intimate partner,"° the most crucial component of eliminating gen-
dered violence is challenging the fundamental inequality of reducing
women to a role of fulfilling a function of the needs of others. In fact,
women are more likely to be victims of violence by an intimate part-
ner when they are fulfilling a traditionally feminized role: women who
are pregnant are twice as likely to be battered by a partner as women
who are not pregnant."10
Focusing attention of violence against women during pregnancy
as an issue of protecting children rather than focusing on violence
against the woman compounds rather than solves the problem. Rele-
gating a woman to a role lesser than the role of her pregnancy rein-
forces the view that the pregnancy is more important than the woman
herself. Thus, the cycle of increased violence against women during
pregnancy continues as women are undervalued as individuals.I"
108. Id. (quoting Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
109. National Domestic Violence Hotline, National Statistics (quoting a 1998 DOJ sur-
vey finding that "of women who reported being raped and/or physically assaulted since the
age of 18, three quarters (76 percent) were victimized by a current or former husband, cohabi-
tating partner, date or boyfriend"), at http://www.ndvh.org/dvlnfo.html (last visited March 26,
2005).
110. Cybergrrl, Inc., Domestic Violence Statistics, Pregnancy and Domestic Violence
(1992), at http://home.cybergrrl.com/dv/stat/statpreg.htnd (last visited March 26, 2005). Fur-
ther, "40 percent of assaults on women by their male partners begin during the first preg-
nancy." Id.
111. See MARl J. MATSUDA, Feminism and the Crime Scare, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW 37, 40-45 (1996) (describing a feminist
opposition to the Violence Against Women Act).
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Increased recognition and enforcement of women's human rights
results in a decrease in domestic violence and other forms of violence
against women, including during pregnancy. With the women's
movement came awareness of the right of women to be free from vio-
lence from their partners and legal protection for battered women. 112
As the women's movement overall increased women's basic human
rights,"3 it challenged the traditional view that women are less than
male "persons" under the constitution and thus not entitled to the same
basic human rights. With rising recognition that women are "persons"
entitled to rights comes the counterpart of protection of women from
violence as autonomous human beings entitled to that protection, both
during and not during pregnancy.
As awareness of domestic violence has increased and women
have become recognized as autonomous individuals as well as mater-
nal beings, the states have addressed the issue of violence against
women during pregnancy in various ways." 4 Significant in state laws
criminalizing attacks on pregnant women are the variety of definitions
given to a fetus at different stages of pregnancy, ranging from a part of
the woman's body to a full human being. 115 Trying to determine the
constitutional rights of a woman who is pregnant in relation to laws
designed to protect the woman and the fetus has engendered a debate
over whether such laws impede on abortion rights."6 Clearly, defin-
ing the termination of a pregnancy as homicide challenges the concept
underlying abortion that a fetus is not an independent human being. "'
The Federal Fetal Homicide Statute of 2004 resulted from politi-
cal motivations both to protect women from violence and to move to-
wards defining the fetus as a human being." 8 Its passing marked a
victory both for some women's rights groups and for anti-abortion
coalitions." 9 The push for a recognition of an attack on a woman
which terminated a pregnancy as a homicide was a result of a political
112. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives,
Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE 59 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
113. Ross ET AL., supra note 4, at xiii-xvi.
114. See generally, e.g., Michael Holzapfel, The Right to Live, the Right to Choose, and
the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 431 (2002).
115. Id. at 450-58 (providing an overview of differing treatments by states of a develop-
ing fetus).
116. See generally, e.g., Alison Tsao, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic
Violence or Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights? 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457 (1998).
117. id.
118. See, e.g., Lori K. Mans, Liability for the Death of a Fetus: Fetal Rights or Women's
Rights?, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 296-98 (2004).
119. Id.
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climate both angered over attacks on pregnant women and contentious
on the topic of abortion rights.120 Ultimately, however, there is an in-
herent conflict between increasing protection of a woman as a human
being and defining a woman as secondary to her reproductive capac-
ity. Thus, the Federal Fetal Homicide Statute is widely criticized for
its treatment of the fetus as a human being even as it is celebrated for
increasing penalties for attacks on a pregnant woman. ' 21
Additionally, the new Fetal Homicide Statute is flawed in its false
reliance on increased penalties as a means of protecting women from
crimes. 22 Rather than increased criminal penalties, "[i]t is the things
[feminists] have asked for all along that will stop crime: quality child
care and paid parental leave, guaranteed minimum income, universal
literacy, affirmative action, and free health care, including mental
health care and drug rehabilitation programs."'' 23 Thus, as feminists,
"[w]e have to say, loudly, that the politicians who gave us more pun-
ishment and no prevention are the cause of the inevitable next wave of
crime that will hit our streets."'24 This approach to increased criminal
penalties for violence against women is fraught with conflict; cer-
tainly, "[t]he lessons of paradox are the lessons of survival under pa-
triarchy."' 125
Further, a demand for increased criminal prosecutions as protec-
tion brings the resultant "disproportionate[] imprison[ment] [of] men
of color . . . not because men of color commit more crimes against
women; contrary to the popular lie, they do not. They do, however,
stand in the places where the system chooses its favorites for punish-
ment."' 26 Thus, the push for increased protection from violence must
be tempered by recognition of the flaws inherent in the criminal jus-
tice system; it is difficult "[a]s a feminist ... [to] celebrate crime leg-
120. Id. at 309 (describing arguments that the "fetal rights" legislation is "a misnomer for
legislation which actually reinforces a woman's autonomy . . .by deterring and punishing
those who take away [the choice protected by Roe v. Wade] by killing a fetus" against the
woman's choice to have a baby, as well as arguments that fetal rights legislation impedes on
abortion rights because it "establishes the fetus as a person").
121. See, e.g., Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215, 215 (2002) ("Although the law tends to increase penalties for assault-
ing a pregnant woman by punishing harm done to her fetus during the attack, opponents of the
UVV fear that the Act will not, in fact, protect women," but will instead "[b]y giving the fetus
human status ... infringe on a woman's constitutional right to choose an abortion as estab-
lished in Roe v. Wade.").
122. MATSUDA, supra note 111, at 45 (describing a feminist opposition to increased
criminal penalties for violence against women).
123. Id. at 42.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 40.
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islation that advances the protection of women without providing for
racial justice."127
In order to effectively increase protection for women from vio-
lence during pregnancy, laws should recognize women as fully
autonomous persons. To do so, laws must be framed in terms of the
woman, and not in terms of "unborn children." To combat human
rights violations against women, laws must first recognize all women
as persons under the Constitution.
B. Proposed Solutions
When the State's interest in potential life is weighed against the
rights of a woman to make decisions regarding her own health and re-
production, the woman's interests must be prioritized above her ma-
ternal function in order to ensure that her constitutional rights are not
violated. If the interest in the fetus is weighed above the woman,
women are not being fully recognized as "persons" under the constitu-
tion, but rather are being relegated to a traditionally feminized role
without the full rights of "persons." Thus, any legislation imple-
mented must be scrutinized by the courts to ensure that laws in viola-
tion of women's rights are not enforced. If the courts consistently
demand that laws respect the rights of women, it will further the rec-
ognition of women as "persons." Such an increased awareness would
then result in a legislature which recognizes those rights in drafting
laws and fewer laws placing women in a secondary position to a ma-
ternal role.
Laws which protect women and further prenatal health are impor-
tant developments towards establishing women's human rights. How-
ever, these laws must be framed in terms of women's rights and not
fetal rights. Defining a fetus at any stage of development as a "human
being" and declaring its termination as homicide or child abuse is not
a truthful or effective means of curtailing violence against women or
protecting children. Rather, such statutes create a false definition of a
woman's pregnancy and place her in a role as secondarily important
as compared with the importance of her pregnancy.1 28 A statute which
defines a woman's pregnancy for her rather than allowing her to de-
fine it herself denies a woman her right to autonomy and disallows a
valuing of the woman as an individual, entitled to protection from vio-
lence and invasions of privacy regardless of her reproductive status.
127. Id. at 39.
128. See Kowalski, supra note 37.
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Preventing violence against women during pregnancy, allowing
women reproductive freedom, and encouraging prenatal health are all
vital issues and valid legal and political objectives. To reach each one
individually without compromising the others requires a consistent
treatment of women as entitled to full human rights independent of
their reproductive statuses.
IV. CONCLUSION
The definition of women in the American social and legal systems
as less than autonomous persons has resulted in a system of laws that
treats an individual woman as secondary to a maternal role.29 An
analysis of federal and state laws around women and pregnancy that
recognizes the ongoing treatment of women in the American legal and
social systems as primarily wives and mothers and secondarily
autonomous individuals demands a reshaping of laws to prioritize a
woman above her maternal role. In order to set a standard for laws
that will allow for a full recognition of woman as "persons" under the
Constitution, entitled to full constitutional rights, the Supreme Court
must disallow laws which relegate women to a maternal function. 30
When a woman is valued within the legal system as an autono-
mous individual, this necessarily includes valuing her during preg-
nancy. Thus, there is no conflict between valuing women as individu-
als rather than as maternal objects and valuing pregnancy and fetal
health. In fact, the two are inseparable. Recognition of the unique
experience of pregnancy and attention to the particular needs of each
woman best serves both the interests of a woman and her preg-
nancy. 3' To attest to value a pregnancy and to seek to protect the
"unborn" from violence while at the same time perpetuating a legal
system which seriously undervalues the woman carrying the preg-
nancy is, at best, oxymoronic. Violence against women in all forms,
including during pregnancy, cannot seriously be challenged by in-
creasing criminal penalties against those who attack women in the
name of protecting the potential life that a woman may be carrying.'32
If the American legal system continues to prioritize a woman's
maternal function above her interests in her own health (be it through
denying a woman the right to terminate a pregnancy to protect her
129. See supra Part III.
130. See supra Part III.
131. See Kowalski, supra note 37.
132. See supra Part III.
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own body, suspending a woman's Fourth Amendment rights in the
name of fetal health, or defining violence against pregnant women in
terms of the effect on the "unborn" rather than the effect on the
woman), women will continue to be valued less as individuals and
more for a maternal function. 133 Only through challenging the ap-
proach to laws which value a woman less as an individual on the basis
of her reproductive capacity, and demanding that all laws value and
enforce every woman's full constitutional rights, will violence against
women be eradicated and true maternal health and safety be realized.
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